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Unhealed Wounds: Japan's Colonization of Korea
Aaron Skabelund
had to endure at the hands of their former
colonizers. Was there something unique
about the colonization of Korea by Japan? If
so, what? Also, why have the political
wounds been so slow to heal between South
Korea and Japan? Will these bitter wounds
undermine the security alliance against the
rising nuclear threat of North Korea?
This paper will seek to answer these
questions. It will also examine how the
change of power in Japan from the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) to the coalition
government led by Morihiro Hosokawa has
affected Japan's political relationship with
South Korea.
When examining the history and
current situation, the significant role of
Japan is evident in causing the original
problems and not taking the necessary steps
since then to lessen the level of distrust.
Although South Korea is not free from
criticism, this paper will concentrate on
Japan's role in the development of the
political relationship with South Korea. A
detailed examination of Japan-North Korean
relations will be bypassed here except for its
current influence on the Japan-South Korean
political relationship, because North Korea's
relations with Japan have been plagued by
communism's influence as well as the
colonial legacy.

Introduction

Second only to English, Japanese is
the language most studied by Korean
students. Cultural and intellectual exchanges
between South Korea and Japan, separated
by only the narrow Korean Strait, are wide
and varied. Business is brisk between Japan,
the world's second largest economy, and
South Korea, a rising industrial power. In
fact, Japan is South Korea's largest source
of imports with 29% of all imports in 1990,
and the South's second largest export market
with 21 % of all exports in 1990 (Bridges
1992, 155). Despite the existence of the
usual trade imbalance in Japan's favor,
business and trade relations are healthy. The
two nations are also linked in a security
relationship via the United States, and both
have urged the United States to stay in Asia
as a stabilizing influence to balance China's
rising power, and especially to temper North
Korea's new nuclear threat. Looking at these
cultural, geographical, economic, and
security relationships between South Korea
and Japan, one might be led to think that
these two countries have a cozy and solid
relationship. However, history haunts Korea
and Japan.
Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to
1945 is the primary cause of this historical
legacy. Despite the tight cultural and
economic links, deep distrust is the still the
rule, not the exception, between the two
countries. For example, "[O]n the South
Korean side, Japan is usually placed as the
next most disliked country after North
Korea" (153).
Many other former colonies of
European imperialist powers have long since
forgiven, if not forgotten, the wrongs they

History

Japan's efforts to invade Korea were
not isolated to the modem era. In the late
15OOs, Japan's ruler, Hideyoshi, led an
invasion to take Korea, but he was
unsuccessful. Even today, this "invasion has
been emphasized in the historic memories of
the Koreans and still contributes to the
-47-

Pi Sigma Alpha Review - 1994
bitterness between them and the Japanese"
(Rei schauer 1990,65). However, during the
Tokugawa period from the early 1600s to
the mid-1800s, Japan maintained good
relations with the "hermit kingdom," as
Korea was sometimes called. Also, Japan
continued trading with Korea despite the
Tokugawa policy of isolationism that meant
a ban on almost all trade and contact.
Soon after the Meiji restoration in
1868, Japan contemplated an invasion of
Korea, but it was rejected in favor of
strengthening the new government and the
nation. The chief proponent of the invasion
was Saigo Takamori, a samurai of samurais,
who was so enthusiastic about the invasion
that he offered himself to be assassinated in
order to provide an excuse for the
aggression. Although the Meiji oligarchs
were hesitant about an immediate invasion
of Korea, they were confident enough to
force Korea out of isolation and into an
unequal treaty in the same manner that had
been dealt to them by Matthew C. Perry.
This action caused the beginning of a series
of showdowns between Japan and China,
and then Japan and Russia for control of the
"hermit kingdom. "
Japan came out the winner in 1905,
after defeating Russia to secure international
recognition of its supremacy in Korea.
Korea's fate was then completely sealed by
the Taft-Katsura Agreement with the United
States. It gave the United States free reign
in Philippines while "acknowledg[ing]
Japan's right to take appropriate measures
for the 'guidance, control, and protection' of
Korea" (Eckert, 238-39).
Japan immediately began to take
control of Korea that year. It forced Korea
to sign the Protectorate Treaty, which gave
Japan absolute authority to take "control and
direct the foreign relations and affairs of
Korea" by placing a Japanese residentgeneral just below the Korean emperor
(McKenzie 1969, 309). In 1907 the

emperor, Kojong, was tricked into
relinquishing the throne to his son, and by
1910 the Japanese had enough power to
coerce the son to resign and allow Japan to
annex Korea. Thus, the sovereignty of
Korea was gradually weakened by the
imperialist rivalries among the surrounding
countries, and then it was systematically
demolished by Japan.
There are three distinct factors that
were unique about the colonization of Korea
by Japan, as compared with other colonial
situations. First, Korea was an established
state with a monarchy that had reigned for
hundreds of years before its unquestioned
sovereignty was destroyed by Japan.
Second, Japan and its colony were closely
related by geography and culture. Third, the
colonization was marked by the usual
intensity and harshness politically, but there
was also an effort made to destroy Korea
culturally through forced assimilation.
Although each of these may not be entirely
unique as compared with other colonial
situations, the combination of the three made
the colonial experience especially severe for
the Korean people and is part of the reason
why it remains an issue even today.
Demolition of a Longtime Sovereign State
In contrast to many Western imperial
powers, Japan began its colonizing late.
Thus, when it took over Korea in 1910, the
Japanese:
did not have the luxury of carving out an
artificial state entity in a political vacuum.
They had to establish their control over an
ancient state and society with a long historical
experience and high degree of racial, ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic homogeneity. Moreover, responding to external pressures, Korea
had already begun the process of transforming
its traditional institutions, and in consequence
the annexation disrupted the indigenous political movement to create a modern Korean
nation-state. (Eckert 1990, 256)
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By "the land owned by the Japanese . . .
amounted to . . . about 60 percent of the
arable land" (Chan 1977, 54). Hundreds of
thousands of Japanese moved across the
Korea Strait to administer the colony, and
"as many as 4,000,000 people, an
astonishing 16 percent of the Korean
population was living" either in Japan or in
other parts of the Japanese empire (such as
Manchuria and Sakhalin) by 1944 (Eckert
1990, 322). These four million Koreans
were mostly laborers, but they also included
"comfort women," young women who were
forced by the Japanese Imperial Army
through kidnapping or trickery to become
prostitutes.
Cultural contiguity combined with
geographic proximity to deepen the wounds.
Japan and Korea, both recipients of Chinese
cultural influences, had many cultural
similarities. There is something uniquely
unsettling about being conquered by your
neighbor and then being ruthlessly exploited
by that nation.

Because of these well-established institutions
and traditions, Korea's opposition to the
takeover was stiff for the entire occupation.
This gave Japan the option to either try to
crush the resistance or assimilate the
Koreans. They tried both approaches, and
both produced frightening results for the
Koreans.
Geographic Proximity and Cultural
Contiguity
Japan was able to take over not via a
bloody invasion in a distant land but through
a series of quietly coercive treaties with a
neighbor. Unlike most colonized countries
that are thousands of miles from the
imperial power, Korea is located only about
one hundred miles from the Japanese island
of Kyushu. This geographic proximity
prompted Japan, which saw outside
dominance of Korea as "a dagger pointing at
Japan's heart," to take over its neighbor
(Bridges 1993, 8); and because of this
proximity, Japan was able to completely
dominate and integrate Korea into its
economic and political system.
The Japanese colonization of Korea
is also unique because it is one of the rare
examples of non-European colonialism in
modem times. Not only was Japan a nonEuropean country, it was a close neighbor
and was still a developing country. These
factors combined to make Japan's policies
(regarding Korea as well as Manchuria)
unlike those of the more developed, distant
Britain. Thus Japan's "control and use of its
colonies were much more extensive,
thorough, and systematic; the economic
structure of the colonies had to undergo
radical and brutal transformation tied to the
needs of rapidly growing Japan" (Woo
1991, 21).
This meant exploitation. Japan first
exploited Korea as a "rice basket" and then
as a source for natural and human resources.

Political and cultural repression
Japan's exploitation of Korea was
complete. It extended from economic to
political and cultural repression. Traditional
government in Korea had been somewhat
decentralized, but with Japanese rule came
increased centralization; even the most local
"trivial matters became issues of public
concern" (258). Also, "Japanese control was
as total as it was brutal . . . ; the Japanese
tried to crush the Korean national identity"
(Bridges 1990, 153). Political repression
was constant during the entire colonial
reign. By 1941, there was a combined
Japanese-managed, Korean-staffed police
force "of over 60,000 ... [that] represented
one policeman for every four hundred
Koreans" (Eckert 1990, 259). From the
beginning in 1910, "[T]he right of assembly
and of free speech were abolished; the
-49-
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holding of non-political public meetings and
the gathering of crowds out-of-doors were
also prohibited except for religious
gatherings or school excursions" (Ku 1985,
11).
Repression spread even to religion
and education. The Japanese used "State
Shinto or nationalistic Shinto ideology" as a
"so-called peaceful offensive" in Korea
(palmer 1977, 141) . Japanese was
established as the national language in
Korean schools, as was a Japanese dictated
curriculum. This "provided a mechanism.
.. to legitimate Japanese rule" and spread
Japanese [M]orals education, the
Japanization of Korean history and culture,
. . . the Japanese language and values that
subtly eroded Korean cultural identity and
confidence" (Eckert 1990,262-63). In 1939,
the Japanese passed an edict that strongly
pressured all Koreans to change their names
to Japanese-style surnames and given names.
By the end of the war, "over eighty-four
percent of the population complied with this
cruelly insensitive edict" (318). In this way,
because the Japanese chose to obfuscate
their policies with the rhetoric of benign
assimilation [the policies were] subtly
confusing and psychologically damaging. To
have cast off one's primary identify for that
of the colonizer demeaned Korean culture in
a profound way. It was, at bottom, a harsh
and brutal system of colonial rule. (319)

200 million dollars in low-interest loans,
while South Korea waived further claims for
war damages" (Mainichi, 30 August 1992).
So why is the colonial era still a political
issue between Japan and Korea? Of course,
history still lingers-the brutality inflicted by
a neighbor does not dissipate quickly. The
1965 treaty "included neither a formal
apology or a reparation clause" to account
for the colonial wrongs committed (Bridges
1993,11). There are also fears that Japan's
latest rise to power- economicallythreatens Korea and the rest of Asia with a
new kind of imperialism. However, there
are two more important contemporary
problems that exist. Both are connected, like
the fears of economic imperialism, to the
colonial period. First is the treatment of
Japan's largest minority population,
Koreans. Second is the denial of the
Japanese government of wrong doing in its
aggression against Asia, and in particular its
colonization of Korea, in the first half of the
century.
Koreans in Japan
According to the Japan Ministry of
Justice statistics, Koreans in Japan now
number about 680,000 (Hoffman 1991,
480), and they continue to be a sore spot
between Korea and Japan. These are
Koreans who chose not to return home after
the war. They are "[g]eographically
concentrated
and economically
restricted, they suffer from a number of
societal and legal disadvantages" (Bridges
1992, 157).
The Koreans in Japan have
continually been the victims of official and
unofficial discrimination. As part of Japan's
"benign assimilation," they were considered
Japanese nationals during the colonial
period, but like their fellow-Koreans on the
peninsula, they found Japanese promises
empty and life hard. After the Great Kanto

Contemporary Review of the Problem
The colonial period ended nearly
forty-eight years ago with Japan's defeat in
the Second World War. Almost thirty years
ago, in 1965, Japan and Korea signed a
treaty that normalized relations. The treaty
was adamantly opposed by many in both
countries. With the treaty, Japan and South
Korea legally settled all war claims. At that
time, Japan provided "South Korea with a
total of 300 million dollars in grants, and
-50-
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Earthquake of 1923 that destroyed Tokyo,
they were the victims, along with Chinese
and socialists, of mob violence. It is
estimated that some six -thousand Koreans
were massacred in the days after the
earthquake (Mainichi, 1 September 1993).
While usually not so violent,
discrimination against Koreans has remained
government policy and is often backed by
popular feelings. Both are starting to
change. Michael Weiner wrote in 1989,
before the changes began to take place:

1993, 131-133). Also, although there have
been some substantive legal changes made
lately to end discrimination, the attitudes of
the Japanese public still lag far behind.
Japanese denial
In 1991, a group of elderly women
came forward after a half a century to tell
of being "forced to serve as 'comfort
women,' the euphemistic term used by
Imperial Japan" (Jones, 11 March 1993).
This was just another incident in a series
that showed how slow the wounds were to
heal. The Japanese had a history of
censoring what was published in the
nation's textbooks. Examples of
propaganda in Education Ministry
approved textbooks have raised
controversy, such as "references to 'antiJapanese resistance' in Korea bering]
changed to difficulties in obtaining 'the
Korean people's cooperation'" (Anger, 27
May 1993). Also the Korean leader in
1989, Roh Tee-woo refused to attend the
funeral of Japan's wartime emperor,
Hirohito (Fararo, 18 February 1989).
In the early nineties, the Japanese
tried to apologize, but at the same time
continued to deny that the army had
actually coerced the Korean and other
Asian women into sex-slavery. The LOP,
which had ruled Japan for over thirty
years, seemed to have no desire to dig up
old dirt. Its apologies, including those
made by Akihito, the new emperor and
Hirohito's son, in 1991, and by Prime
Minister Miyazawa in January 1992, were
undermined by the fact that it had taken so
long to face up to Japan's war guilt and
the apologies themselves were vague and
indirect. Even after Miyazawa admitted
that Japan had used "comfort women" he
continued to deny the use of force. This
evoked bitter reactions in South Korea,
who questioned "whether Japan is willing

Although the vast majority were born in Japan and
speak Japanese as their first language, relatively few
possess Japanese citizenship. Most are classified by the
Ministry of Justice as aliens, and Koreans compose
more than 85 % of the total foreign resident population.
This limits their legal rights in the broadest sense. (1)

In 1988, during Prime Minster Toshiki
Kaifu's visit to Korea, the Japanese finally
"agreed to replace the alien registration
system for Korean residents with a family
registration system by 1992" (Bridges 1992,
157). The most controversial step of the
previous system, the requirement for all
Japanese-Koreans to be finger-printed, was
finally dropped for most. But there is still
deep criticism that the new laws are only
cosmetic (Mainichi, 31 May 92).
The Japanese government has been
making progress on the Korean-Japanese
issue, but such criticism shows that it will
continue to be a source of controversy that
brings back colonial-era memories. Other
complaints include those about Koreans
deserted on the Russian-held island of
Sakhalin who are unable to return due to
political differences in the area (Mainichi,
23 December 1990); Korean victims of the
A-bombs dropped at the end of the war,
who have received almost no financial
compensation from the Japanese government
compared to Japanese victims; and for the
Korean women forced into prostitution for
Japanese soldiers during the war (Bridges
-51-
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to come to grips with its past, and whether
it can gain enough trust from its neighbors
to take a greater leadership role in the
world" (Blustein, 10 July 1992). Pressure
to apologize in Japan rose as well. Asahi
Shinbun, Japan's second largest newspaper
after the Mainichi, blasted the government,
declaring that:This is the time to squarely
face our troubled past blemishes . . . .
Otherwise, we will be repeating an
undesirable practice in Japanese
diplomacy-taking piecemeal measures
only when pressed. It will be impossible to
fraternize with other Asian nations as an
ordinary country without expressing our
genuinely national contrition" (13).
Nevertheless, Miyazawa only admitted to
"coercive action" on his final day in
office.

our children what their forefathers did in
waging war on the Asian continent"
(Schlesinger, 5 August 1993). The
government signaled its seriousness to put
its words into actions quickly "when only
four members of the new cabinet attended
annual ceremonies at Yasukuni shrine in
Tokyo to pay respects to Japan's war dead.
In 1992, when the LDP controlled the
government, 15 cabinet members attended"
and in 1985, LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone even attended, which brought a
wave of criticism from Korea and other
countries (Bussy, 16 August 1993). In this
way, the coalition government is taking
steps toward warmer political relations with
Korea that match their strong economic ties.
Korea, who has always privately given
business ties priority while publicly
supporting its victims (such as the "comfort
women"), seems to have little to gain from
continued bitterness. However, the Japanese
government must continue to match its
words with the appropriate actions in such
areas as textbooks about the colonial period
and compensation for the former "comfort
women."

Change
The coalition government that forced
out the LDP for the first time in over thirty
years is headed up by Morihiro Hosokawa.
From the start, the new government made it
clear that it would act decisively without
being pressed. In a series of remarkable
statements that even went too far for some
within the coalition, Hosokawa apologized
again and again in a "simple and
straightforward" way uncharacteristic of the
LDP (Bussy, 16 August 1993). He called
the Second World War "a war of
aggression" (Jones, 13 August 93) and
added in a statement to the Diet that he
"would like to take this opportunity to
express our profound remorse and apologies
for the fact that Japan's actions, including
acts of aggression and colonial rule, caused
unbearable suffering and sorrow for so
many people" (Reid, 24 August 1993).
The new government also seems set
to be more open about the past in the
schools. Hosokawa's foreign mInIster,
Tsutomu Hata, stated that "We should tell

North Korea
Hosokawa and the new coalition
government's efforts to mend relations with
South Korea is also a response to the role of
a third player, North Korea. Primarily
because of ideology and security
arrangements, and secondarily because it is
further hampered by colonial memories,
Japan and the North have never been able to
establish relations. Several times the North
Koreans have met low-level Japanese
officials and made attempts toward relations,
but they have been unsuccessful partly due
the insistence of the North, and the South,
on an "either/or" type of policy. This means
that if Japan establishes relations with the
North, it must drop its relations with the
-52-
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South. There is no chance that Japan will do
this. However, North Korea's efforts to
develop nuclear weapons may test the
tenuous political relationship of South Korea
and Japan. This may be in part be why
Hosokawa is diligently seeking to resolve
lingering South Korean grievances.
Most likely the South KoreanJapanese alliance will hold strong, backed
by the military might of the United States.
However, there may still be problems that
have their roots in the colonial period. The
Koreans in Japan are far from united in their
support for the South in the duel over the
Korean peninsula. There is considerable
support for Kim II Sung and considerable
illegal trade and money-laundering between
the Korean-Japanese and the North. Money
generated from this trade "has allowed the
bankrupt North Korean government to build
its huge nuclear weapons complex" (Sanger,
1 November 1993).
As the nuclear facility inspection
crisis heated up in early 1994, it was
revealed that old Russian attack submarines
were being sold to the North via a Japanese
company owned by a Korean-Japanese
(Sanger, 20 January 1994). However,
Japanese officials are unenthusiastic about
cracking down on the exchange of money
between Korean-Japanese and the North
(especially the estimated $600 million to $2
billion supplied to family members and
government officials), or participation in an
embargo that would have the same effect.
The Japanese are "worried about causing.
.. 'an eruption'-perhaps including riots or
terrorism-among the roughly 150,000
Koreans [later estimated at 300,000] in
Japan who are sympathetic to Mr. Kim's
Government" (Sanger, 1 November 1993
[20 January 1994]). Such incidents would
certainly worsen Japan's already poor
relations with Koreans in Japan and also
with a concerned South Korea. Resolution of
this domestic problem, in order to meet

decisively and wisely with the North Korean
threat, requires that the Japanese
government work closely with the South
Korean government and the United States.
Conclusion

Two of the historical factors that
make the colonial period unique, the
violation of Korea's long held sovereignty
and the proximity and contiguity of the two
countries geographically and culturally, are
both products of situation, uncontrolled by
individuals or states. The imperialist drive
was an international tendency of the time
that may have influenced the rising Japan
(looking for new markets to keep the Meiji
industrial revolution rolling) to crush Korea
politically and economically. However,
Japanese imperialism into Asia was initiated
by a shift in government policy that changed
the emphasis from internal modernization
and industrialization to external expansion to
aid continued industrialization. Using the
favored vehicle of the era, Japan adapted
imperialism backed by militarism. The
almost complete cultural repression was a
government-led policy.
Japan was forced to open itself up to
outside influences with the Meiji restoration.
Then, as its industrial strength increased due
to adaptation and hard work, its confidence
grew and it sought expansion to foreign
markets and looked to become an
international power. The post-war period has
brought what many believe is a repeat of
that cycle in a new world system. Japan's
economic influence has expanded across the
world. It is now looking to become a world
political power. This has been initiated once
again by a shift in government policy, this
time due to an upset election that brought in
a new generation of younger, more
internationally-oriented leaders. Hosokawa is
seeking to change decades of LDP foreign
(and domestic) policy. Japan is looking to
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mend relations with South Korea (and other
Asian nations) so that Japan can once again
become a regional and world political
power. This time the means are not
imperialism and colonial exploitation, but
internationalism (great power politics) and
economic opportunism. The results are
different as well; now there is foreign aid,
financial compensation, and apologies.
For Japan to deal effectively with
regional challenges of the present, Japan
must face up to the past. In order to meet
the security challenges of the North Korean
nuclear threat, the Hosokawa-Ied coalition
government must continue to build stronger
relations with South Korea. Japan has
maintained that the 1965 treaty legally
provided for all compensation to South
Korea. Yet to symbolically, psychologically,
and politically heal the wounds and lead a
reluctant Japanese public to recognition of
its past wrongs and an end to current
prejudices, the Government needs to
continue take positive steps. Such steps as

direct monetary compensation for the
"comfort women"" (who continue to protest
in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in
early 1994 [Associated Press, 27 January
1994]) and other groups such as the A-bomb
victims, completely fair treatment of the
Korean minority, and continued sincere
signs of Japanese contrition and recognition
of its past colonial policies are needed in
order to strengthen the relationship between
the two countries.
If Japan continues to
make progress in these areas, then South
Korea will have no excuse but to forgive if
not forget. While it may be well for the
Koreans to not entirely forget Japanese
aggression, it would be beneficial for both
countries if Korea stopped perceiving Japan
as its former colonial master, and thus a
current economic imperialist threat, and
instead saw Japan as a partner in
maintaining regional security and as a
valuable trading partner. Only then will the
colonial memories stop haunting Japan and
South Korea.
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